Free Agency and Lemos’s Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will

Document Type : Research Paper

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Department of Philosophy Wilfrid Laurier University 75 University Avenue, West

10.22091/jptr.2026.17198.3657

Abstract

 
I explore John Lemos’s recent indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will and evaluate its promise as a model for human and artificial free agency. First, I disambiguate two different interpretations of the model and clarify which interpretation Lemos prefers. I distinguish between an episodic model and non-episodic model. According to the first there are discrete weightings of reasons that occur during deliberation. According to the second there are no such discreet weightings; instead, reasons are assigned their weights at the end of deliberation just before choosing. I argue that Lemos prefers a non-episodic model which avoids a version of the luck objection, namely, one raised by Haji. I then raise some problems for the non-episodic model. First, I argue following Haji that the model lacks a sufficiently agent-centred account of how an agent assigns weights to her reasons. However, I propose that the model might avoid this problem if it included an appeal to a higher order setting of priorities by the agent. Despite this possibility, I also argue that without providing a deeper account of the plural voluntary control agents have over the undetermined weighting of reasons the model is too luck-infected to succeed.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 08 September 2026

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