A critical review of Craig’s neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Ph.D. Candidate, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Professor, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

3 Assistant Professor, Philosophy Department, Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

​William Lane Craig attempts to defend the universe's beginning and God’s post-creation temporality by reviving "absolute time" and the dynamic A-theory of time through a Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of Special Relativity. He contends that an objective, absolute temporal framework is essential for asserting a literal beginning of the cosmos and God’s interaction with the world. Utilizing a philosophical-critical analysis and reviewing contemporary literature, this research presents four fundamental critiques of Craig’s Neo-Lorentzian project: (1) the ambiguity regarding the criteria for absolute time and the arbitrary selection of cosmic time as the privileged frame; (2) the ontological dualism between divine and physical time, lacking a clear causal mechanism; (3) the epistemological skepticism arising from the rift between absolute reality and empirical data; and (4) challenges concerning truth-makers for divine foreknowledge within an A-theory framework. The analysis demonstrates that the assumption of absolute time is not only unnecessary for Craig’s theological objectives but also generates internal inconsistencies within his system. Ultimately, despite its significance in revisiting the problem of God and time, the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation remains philosophically indefensible, necessitating a serious revision in understanding the relationship between creation, time, and divinity.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 05 October 2026

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