Personal Identity and the Posthuman Project: A Philosophical Critique of Mind Uploading and Human–Machine Integration in Light of Sadrian Theory of the Soul

Document Type : Research Paper

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Faculty Member, Department of Islamic Studies, Faculty of Basic and Applied Sciences, Kermanshah University of Technology

Abstract

Using a descriptive-analytical and critical approach, this study evaluates the philosophical foundations of two transhumanist projects—“mind uploading” (scan-and-copy vs. gradual neural replacement) and “human-machine integration” (cyborgization)—regarding personal identity persistence. The core question is whether models based on functional reductionism and purely informational-psychological continuity can account for the survival of the “self.” Grounded in Sadrian psyche-ontology and principles such as the primacy and individuation of existence, substantial motion, the intrinsic soul-body unity, and the corporeal conditions of emergence (prepared temperament vs. artifactual compounds), a fundamental distinction is revealed between identity preservation in instrumental machine integration and its dissolution in mind uploading. Findings demonstrate that informational structural reproduction and computational simulation on silicon substrates, lacking ontological connection and generative conditions for soul emanation, fail the criteria for personal identity persistence, merely creating a distinct entity. Beyond critiquing transhumanist foundations, this study elucidates the constructive implications of Sadrian psychology for delineating the boundaries of mind modeling and instrumental artificial intelligence.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research

Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 05 October 2026

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