Moser’s Criticism of Divine Hiddenness Argument

Document Type : Research Paper


Assistant professor of department of philosophy, Al-Mustafa International University


  Canadian Philosopher, John L. Schellenberg, formally proposed and formulated "Divine Hiddenness Argument" in 1993 for the first time. In this atheistic argument, he states that God does not provide sufficient evidence for His existence at least to some people for some times, thus He is hidden. According to his argument which is based on God’s perfect love, Schellenberg believes that if God perfectly loves people as his creatures, He will provide sufficient evidence for his existence to them and therefore He is not hidden. But God does not provide sufficient evidence to them, therefore He is not perfect lover and disbelieving in His existence is rational and inculpable. Schellenberg believes that "Divine hiddenness Argument" justifies atheism and accordingly refutes the existence of God. Paul K. Moser, contemporary American philosopher, rejects Schellenberg’s view in his new approach to epistemology of religion. Rejecting the evidence for Divine hiddenness, Moser believes that there is sufficient evidence for the existence of God. According to Moser, however, this evidence greatly differs with what the people naturally expect. Based on volitional knowledge, he believes that it is the God, not man, who determines the genuine authority and resource for kinds of evidence and its evaluation. So, Moser does not consider divine hiddenness argument, which is formulated on the basis of human authority, successful in justification of divine hiddenness and in refutation of God’s existence.


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