Foley’s Comprehensive Schema for Rationality and Everyday Quotidian Phenomena

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom

2 (Corresponding Author) PhD Student of Comparative Philosophy, University of Qom,

Abstract

Rationalityis a subject-matter for what pertains to epistemology, axiology, and belief justification. It deals mostly with the clarification of truth (and its criteria) and evaluation criteria of human miscellaneous sciences. The aim of this article is to offer an explanation for Foley’s comprehensive schema for rationality. Denying the possibility of a necessary relationship between theory of knowledge and justified belief, he takes some strides in completing and modifying the primary project of Aristotelian telos-oriented conception of rationality. Having illustrated the mentioned strides, this article will elucidate Foley’s two requisites for the comprehensiveness of rational evaluation (taking into account of individual’s all goals including theoretical and practical ones, and deconfining the adopted perspective). With due careful attention to the important role pragmatic goals and reasons play in Foley’s schema, this article strives to illustrate the fact that how the mentioned reasons bear indirect impacts upon the rational evaluation of phenomena, and do the same upon the characterization of necessary criteria for justified belief. The current impact is pertaining to the subject to-be-believed and the believer’s social role. The result and conclusion of this article is to introduce Foley’s theory as a relatively comprehensive and efficient understanding of rationality; a theory toward which there have simultaneously been raised some objections including yielding relativism, over-leniency, neglectfulness to social objective criteria, unapologeticity, instrumentalism, and neglectfulness to other kinds of rationality other than rational one. 

Keywords


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