The Ontological and Epistemological Transition of the Soul: A Comparison between Mulla Sadra’s Active Intelligence and Hegel’s Absolute Geist

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 (Corresponding Author) Assistant Professor, Dept. of Theology and Islamic Studies, Payame Noor University

2 Assistant Professor, Dept. of Theology, Shahrekord University

Abstract

By putting forward a divine introvertive existence of the active intelligence within his book entitled al-Shawādhid al-Rubūbiyya, the third Ishrāq (illumination) of the third Mashhad, Mulla Sadra has brought forth a novel theory of the transition and/or becoming process of soul. Although the active intelligence’s existence-in-itself is the same exactly as its mode of existence for the soul and as one of the modes of the soul’s modes, it can be recognized also as the soul’s telos and perfection. Accordingly, there arises some kind of justification for the soul’s passivity and affection generated from the divine introvertive existence of active intelligence, and for the soul’s attachment and unity with the active intelligence. Hereupon, the active intelligence acts simultaneously as the agent of the soul’s existence as well as its telos. To Hegel, “the Absolute” wholly shares its essence with the subject; here lies the nature of the subject and the subject’s telos is to become absolute as though the Absolute is a mode among many other ones of the subject. Consequently, the “soul” intelligibly becomes and unite with the self-thinking self (Geist) or pure self-consciousness. In this transformation, the respects of causation and telos are both identical. The Absolute constitutes itself through self-consciousness so as to become Geist on a temporal process. The aim of this article is to analyze and yield an exact comparison between the two theories, and to clarify that both of them, despite their differences, explain the soul’s epistemic alteration by exploiting the concept of self-consciousness. 

Keywords


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