عنوان مقاله [English]
Intentionality is one of the main properties of mental states in which mental states are about something. Hence, one of the issues of the philosophy of mind is the physicalistic explanation of this property. The subject of this article is an examination of the possibility of intentionality and how to determine the content in the teleological theory of mental content. According to this theory, the natural evolution of the living organism and its teleological functions determine the content and, upon it, a natural and physical explanation of intentionality and content can be obtained. In this article, we first discuss two of the main versions of this theory, namely the indicator semantics of Dretske and the teleosemantics of Millikan, and then evaluate it. The most important objection to this theory is that it cannot explain the content and meaning of logical and philosophical concepts as well as the content of empty concepts, and thus, even if it can specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for content determination in concepts that are closely related to the biological affairs, it cannot be successful.