واقع‌گرایی علمی عبارت است از این دیدگاه که بهترین نظریه‌های علمی ما توصیف‌های تقریباً حقیقی از جنبه‌های مشاهده‌پذیر و مشاهده‌ناپذیر جهان مستقل از ذهن عرضه می‌کند. مناقشه واقع‌گرایان و منتقدانشان بر سر این دیدگاه در قلب مباحث فلسفه علم است. در این مقاله، پس از بررسی اصول محوری موضع واقع‌گرایانه می‌کوشیم ادله آنها را در پاسخ به انتقادات مطرح‌شده از سوی دیدگاه‌های رقیب ذکر کنیم.
Scientific Realism: Doctrines and Arguments in Its Favour
نویسندگان [English]
Morteza Fathizade
چکیده [English]
Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates on this view between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. In this essay, we examine the core principles of the realist position, and indicate some reasons in the conflict with its rivals.
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