عنوان مقاله [English]
The point of this paper is to compare substitution from the perspective of Levinas and the replacement sympathy as two approaches in facing another. Sympathy, as one of the moral issues, is a way of paying attention and understanding the anxiety, worry or need of others, which occurs consciously and with the recognition and replacement of another. The substitution from the perspective of Levinas is also in relation to the "other" and outlines the scope of the subject's responsibility towards him. In the beginning, Levina’s subject imperially reduces the other to himself, but in the face of the "other", he pays attention to the irreducibility and dependence of the consistency of his nature on it. In this way, the infinite responsibility towards the "other" becomes apparent; A responsibility that is formed before any kind of consciousness and self- consciousness and in a more passive space than any passivity, and its scope extends to substitution the "other" and expiation of the "other". In the shadow of this infinite responsibility, substitution is distinguished from sympathetic and empathetic replacement.
Sympathy, which has been described as a virtue in many moral systems, is a form of altruism through which actor, by entering into other’s worries and sufferings, replaces himself in a scene of his pain. This replacement is based on knowing the other and imagining his position and ultimately transforming the other into another me. Accordingly, some have introduced sympathy and benevolence as the basis of morality (see. Hume, 2009: 499-500) and by emphasizing the essential role of compassion in human moral life, argument is made on compassion as a pillar of morality. (Schopenhauer, 1903: 171). Levinas also speaks of substitution in several positions in his work, which is defined as a replacement in sympathy in relation to another. In other words, replacement in sympathy is the product of the relation between the actor and the other, and substitution in Levinas is based on subjectivity, which is itself based on the relation between the subject and the "Other." This paper wants to provide a comparative analysis of the subject's substitution in Levinas with the concept of replacement on sympathy.
Of course, although the concept of "other" in Levinas's thought is different from the other in symphaty, the relationship between ‘replacement’ (taking the place of) and ‘substitution’ in the two can be examined; for although in Levinas's view the position of the "other" is defined beyond the essence of the subject and in sympathy after the stage of essence, substitution in Levinas can be proposed in terms of rank later than the stage of essence.
‘Substituting the other’ in Levinas, unlike " replacing the other" in sympathy, while excluding cognition, changes from another level of understanding the other to the position of expiation of the other, and such a change is justified by the explanation of subjectivity.
The view of thinkers on the issue of sympathy has been studied in several articles.
Breyer (2019) has compared empathy, sympathy, and compassion with reference to the views of Western thinkers
Maibom (2009) seeks to explain that although empathy is an important moral emotion, it is not necessary to understand or motivate moral norms; Hence they are not the fundamental source of human goodness
Mower (2009) considering the delinquency in adolescents and also using Hume's teachings, believes that teaching moral concepts is possible without theorizing and only through sympathy