Haji and the Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA

چکیده

In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Haji and the Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will

نویسنده [English]

  • John Lemos
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA
چکیده [English]

In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Free will
  • Libertarianism
  • Indeterministic weightings
  • Luck
  • John Lemos
  • Isthtiyaque Haji

مراجع

Clarke, R. (2002). Libertarian views: critical survey of noncausal and event-causal accounts of free agency. In Kane, R. (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 365-385). Oxford University Press.
Haji, I. (2022). Libertarianism and luck. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 24, 115-134. http://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2021.7186.2581
Kane, R. (2002). Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In Kane, R. (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 406-437). Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2007a). Libertarianism. in Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, & Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 5-43). Blackwell.
Kane, R. (2007b). Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas. In Fischer,
Kane, Pereboom, & Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 166-183).
Blackwell.
Kane, R. (2011). Rethinking free will: new perspectives on an ancient problem. In Kane, R. (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 381-404). Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2019). The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism, and volitional streams. Synthese, 196, 145-160.       
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1046-8
Lemos, J. (2018). A pragmatic approach to libertarian free will. Routledge Press.
Lemos, J. (2021). The indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. In a special “Free Will” issue of Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 23, 137-156. http://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2021.7187.2582
Lemos, J. (2023). Free will’s value: criminal justice, pride, and love. Routledge Press.
McCall, S., & Lowe, E. J. (2005). Indeterminist free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 681-690. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00420.x
McCall, S., & Lowe, E. J. (2008). The determinists have run out of luck for a good reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, 745-748.      
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00218.x
Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. Oxford University Press.
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Harvard University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2007). Hard incompatibilism. In Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas, Four views on free will (pp. 85-125). Blackwell.
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پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی
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