نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار گروه حکمرانی فرهنگی اجتماعی، دانشکده حکمرانی، دانشگاه تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Avicenna’s treatment of future contingents appears to pull his philosophy in two directions. In al-ʿIbāra I.10, some future-directed propositions seem not to possess presently settled truth values; elsewhere, his modal metaphysics and causal theory make complete causes necessitate their effects. Recent scholarship has sharpened this tension by opposing an epistemic reading of future contingency to an ontic-alethic reading that invokes the Coexistence Principle to preserve an open future. Using an analytical-critical method, this article argues that coexistence is insufficient for that stronger conclusion. The present nonexistence of a future event’s complete cause does not entail the absence of antecedent conditions that determinately necessitate the later emergence of that cause. This inferential gap is termed the Coexistence–Determination Gap. The article further distinguishes intrinsic possibility, alethic unsettledness, and diachronic modal openness, showing that none can be substituted for another without additional premises. It concludes that al-ʿIbāra supports a temporally indexed alethic openness more securely than a branching metaphysics of alternative futures.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله