AI, Persons, Free Will, and a Policy Recommendation

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA

چکیده

 This essay examines whether artificial intelligence (AI) could ever qualify as persons entitled to the same rights and responsibilities as human persons. The discussion engages two classic contributions to the philosophy of mind: William Lycan's argument that a suitably programmed machine could possess mentality and free will, and John Searle's Chinese Room argument, which casts doubt on the claim that syntactic symbol manipulation alone can generate genuine understanding or intentionality. The author concurs with Lycan that a properly programmed AI could, in principle, possess free will, but advances a distinct account of this possibility grounded in an event-causal libertarian theory of free will. The author argues that he and Robert Kane have both advanced theories of libertarian free will that could allow a properly programmed AI to possess free will. Nevertheless, the author contends that Searle's critique furnishes substantial grounds for skepticism regarding the personhood of any future AI, since genuine understanding and first-person intentionality may not be realizable in computational systems. Given this residual uncertainty, and given the profound moral and legal implications that would follow from granting personhood to AI, the essay proposes a precautionary policy recommendation: we should refrain from creating AI systems that, for all we know, may or may not be persons. The argument thus integrates metaphysical analysis of free will and personhood with applied ethical and policy considerations, offering a framework for responsible development of increasingly sophisticated artificial agents.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

AI, Persons, Free Will, and a Policy Recommendation

نویسنده [English]

  • john lemos
Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA
چکیده [English]

 This essay examines whether artificial intelligence (AI) could ever qualify as persons entitled to the same rights and responsibilities as human persons. The discussion engages two classic contributions to the philosophy of mind: William Lycan's argument that a suitably programmed machine could possess mentality and free will, and John Searle's Chinese Room argument, which casts doubt on the claim that syntactic symbol manipulation alone can generate genuine understanding or intentionality. The author concurs with Lycan that a properly programmed AI could, in principle, possess free will, but advances a distinct account of this possibility grounded in an event-causal libertarian theory of free will. The author argues that he and Robert Kane have both advanced theories of libertarian free will that could allow a properly programmed AI to possess free will. Nevertheless, the author contends that Searle's critique furnishes substantial grounds for skepticism regarding the personhood of any future AI, since genuine understanding and first-person intentionality may not be realizable in computational systems. Given this residual uncertainty, and given the profound moral and legal implications that would follow from granting personhood to AI, the essay proposes a precautionary policy recommendation: we should refrain from creating AI systems that, for all we know, may or may not be persons. The argument thus integrates metaphysical analysis of free will and personhood with applied ethical and policy considerations, offering a framework for responsible development of increasingly sophisticated artificial agents.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • artificial intelligence
  • personhood
  • free will
  • libertarianism
  • moral status
  • AI policy

مراجع

 Allen, R. F. (2005). Free will and indeterminism: Robert Kane's libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research, 30, 341–355. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20053042
Ayer, A. J. (1954). Freedom and necessity. In Philosophical essays (pp. 3–20). St. Martin's Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_12
Baker, L. R. (1981). Why computers can't act. American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 157–163.
Balaguer, M. (2010). Free will as an open scientific problem. MIT Press.
Berkich, D. (2018). Machine intentions. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 18, 3–10.
Caruso, G. (2021). Rejecting retributivism: Free will, punishment, and criminal justice. Cambridge University Press.
Caruso, G. (2025). Event-causal libertarianism, indeterministic weightings, and the pragmatic approach. Philosophia, 53, 905–914. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406- 025-00813-0
Clarke, R. (2002). Libertarian views: Critical survey of noncausal and event-causal accounts of free agency. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 356–385). Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1984a). Elbow room. MIT Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1984b). I could not have done otherwise – so what? Journal of Philosophy, 81, 553–567.
Dennett, D. C. (2003). Freedom evolves. Viking Press.
Ekstrom, L. (2003). Free will, chance, and mystery. Philosophical Studies, 113, 153–180. https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1023940209581
Flanagan, O. (2002). The problem of the soul: Two visions of the mind and how to reconcile them. Basic Books.
Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–839. https://doi.org/10.2307/2023833
Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 5–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024717
Haji, I. (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt style examples. Philosophical Explorations, 2, 42–58.
Haji, I. (2005). Libertarianism, luck, and action explanation. Journal of Philosophical Research, 30, 321–340. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20053041
Haji, I. (2022). Libertarianism and luck. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 24, 115–134. https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2022.8297.2723
Haji, I. (2023). Further reflections on Lemos's indeterministic weightings view of libertarian free will. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 25, 119– 130. https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2023.9722.2929
Hobbes, T. (1958). Leviathan. Bobbs-Merrill. (Original work published 1651)
Hume, D. (1974). An enquiry concerning human understanding. In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, The empiricists. Anchor Books. (Original work published 1748)
Kane, R. (1996). The significance of free will. Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2002). Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 406–437). Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2007a). Libertarianism. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 5–43). Blackwell.
Kane, R. (2007b). Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 166–183). Blackwell.
Kane, R. (2011). Rethinking free will: New perspectives on an ancient problem. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 381–404). Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2014). New arguments in debates on libertarian free will: Responses to contributors. In D. Palmer (Ed.), Libertarian free will: Contemporary debates. Oxford University Press.
Kane, R. (2021). Making sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism: A fourth way forward. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 23, 5–28. https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2021.7247.2595
Kane, R. (2024). The complex tapestry of free will: A philosophical odyssey. Oxford University Press.
Lawrence, D., & Morley, S. (2021). Regulating the Tyrell Corporation: The emergence of novel beings. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 30, 421–434. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180120000973
Lemos, J. (2018). A pragmatic approach to libertarian free will. Routledge.
Lemos, J. (2023a). Free will's value: Criminal justice, pride, and love. Routledge.
Lemos, J. (2023b). Haji and the indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, 25, 101–118. https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2023.9648.2920
Lemos, J. (2025a). Precis of Free will's value: Criminal justice, pride, and love. Philosophia, 53, 905–914. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00870-5
Lemos, J. (2025b). Replies to Caruso, Elzein, Pereboom, Sekatskaya, and Smilansky. Philosophia, 53, 973–993. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00904-y
Levy, N. (2011). Hard luck: How luck undermines free will and moral responsibility. Oxford University Press.
List, C. (2025). Can AI systems have free will? Synthese, 206, 115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05209-x
Long, R., Sebo, J., Butlin, P., Finlinson, K., Fish, K., Harding, J., Pfau, J., Sims, T., Birch, J., & Chalmers, D. (2024). Taking AI welfare seriously (arXiv:2411.00986) [Preprint]. arXiv. https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2411.00986
Lycan, W. (2013). Robots and minds. In J. Feinberg & R. Shafer-Landau (Eds.), Reason and responsibility: Readings in some basic problems of philosophy (pp. 358– 363). Wadsworth. (Original work published 1987)
Mele, A. (1998). Review of Robert Kane's The significance of free will. Journal of Philosophy, 95, 581–584. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil1998951122
Mele, A. (1999a). Kane, luck, and the significance of free will. Philosophical Explorations, 2, 96–104. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869799908520970
Mele, A. (1999b). Ultimate responsibility and dumb luck. Social Philosophy and Policy, 16, 274–293. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002478
Mill, J. S. (1874). A system of logic. Harper and Row.
Moore, G. E. (1912). Free will. In Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Nielsen, K. (1971). The compatibility of freedom and determinism. In Reason and practice. Harper and Row.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2007a). Hard incompatibilism. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 85–125). Blackwell.
Pereboom, D. (2007b). Response to Kane, Fischer, and Vargas. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four views on free will (pp. 191–203). Blackwell.
Pereboom, D. (2014). Free will, agency, and meaning in life. Oxford University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2023). Review of Why free will is real? Criminal Law and Philosophy, 17, 229–234. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-022-09634-8
Pereboom, D. (2025). Event-causal libertarianism without settling. Philosophia, 53, 961–972. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025-00914-w
Searle, J. (2013). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Feinberg & R. Shafer-Landau (Eds.), Reason and responsibility: Readings in some basic problems of philosophy (pp. 351–358). Wadsworth. (Original work published 1980)
Sekatskaya, M. (2025). Manipulation, indeterminacy, and the luck problem: On Lemos' Free will's value. Philosophia, 53, 953–960. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-025- 00878-x
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). Free will, praise, and blame. Mind, 70, 291–306.
Steward, H. (2012). A metaphysics for freedom. Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. (2000). The unhelpfulness of indeterminism. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 60, 149–155. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653435
Van Inwagen, P. (2002). Free will remains a mystery. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of free will (pp. 158–177). Oxford University Press.
Waller, B. (1988). Free will gone out of control. Behaviorism, 16, 149–162.
Watson, G. (1975). Free agency. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 205–220. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024703
Wolf, S. (1987). Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility. In F. Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility, character, and emotions (pp. 45–64). Cambridge University Press.
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford University Press.
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله
CAPTCHA Image

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار