علیّت عدمی و بررسی یک روایتِ ناواقع‌گرایانه

نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه باقرالعلوم(ع)، ایران

چکیده

تاریخ دریافت:  31/0۴/۱۳۹۷         |           تاریخ پذیرش:  ۲۲/۱۱/۱۳۹۷
در زبان روزمره، زبان علمی، احکام اخلاقی و دعاوی حقوقی جملات زیادی وجود دارد که در آنها امری عدمی، علّت یا معلول یا هم علّت و هم معلول واقع شده است؛ جملاتی مانند: «بی‌توجهیِ حامد به گُل‌ها علّت از میان رفتن‌ آنهاست»، «کمبود ویتامینِ دی علّت بیماری نرم‌استخوانی است» و «خودداری جرّاح از جراحی، علّت مرگ بیمار است». علیّت مورد استفاده در این جملات را می‌توان «علیّت عدمی» خواند. یک پرسش اساسی دربارۀ این دست جملات این است که آیا کاربرد واژۀ «علت» در چنین مواردی، ناشی از بی‌دقتی و تسامح است یا حاکی از امری واقعی و مستقل از ذهن ما. به بیان دیگر، آیا باید تعبیر «علیّت» در این جملات را واقع‌گرایانه خوانده، حاکی از امری عینی دانست و یا آن‌که باید آنها را ناواقع‌گرایانه خواند و بیانِ محرَّفی از واقعیت شمرد. هلن بیبی از جمله فیلسوفان تحلیلی است که از موضعی دیویدسونی بر ناواقع‌گرایی در علیّت عدمی استدلال کرده‌ است. نگارنده پس از توضیح کوتاه علیّت عدمی و طرح مسئله، به صورت‌بندی و ارزیابی استدلال‌های بیبی پرداخته، نشان داده که استدلال‌های او ناتمام است. ادعای نویسنده در اینجا، صرفاً انتقادی و سلبی است و به منزلۀ دفاع از واقع‌گرایی در علیّت عدمی نیست.
طالقانی ، سید علی. (۱۳۹۸). علیّت عدمی و بررسی یک روایتِ ناواقع‌گرایانه. فصلنامه پژوهش‌های فلسفی۔کلامی. ۲۱  (۷۹)،  ۹۷۔۱۲۰.     https://doi.org/ 10.22091/jptr-pfk.2019.3417.1924

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Absent causation and a critical review of a non-realistic theory

نویسنده [English]

  • Sayyed Ali Taleghani
 Department of Philosophy and Theology, Baqir al-Olum University
چکیده [English]

Absence Causation and a Critical Review of a Non-Realistic Theory
Sayyed Ali Taleghani*  
Received: 22/07/2018       |       Accepted: 11/02/2019
Abstract
Causality in some contexts such as “Hamid’s failure to water his plants was a cause of their death.” and “Rickets is caused by a deficiency of vitamin D” can be called "absence causation". In this paper, the main question is whether the use of the term “cause” in such instances due to carelessness and a misuse of language or denotes something that is real and independent of our minds. Defending the first view can be called “anti-realism” in absence causation and the second as “anti-realism”. Helen Beebee is one of the contemporary philosophers that defend anti-realistic theory of absence causation. Her main argument is, in short, as Davidson said, that causation is a relation between events, whereas there are no negative events, therefore, there is no genuine absence causation. However, the main objection that those like her encounter is the common and strong linguistic intuition in sentences like Hamid’s inattentiveness to plants. Beebee has argued that our intuitions in these cases are wrong and the author strives to show that her arguments have failed to achieve this goal.
 
 
ع
 



* Department of Philosophy and Theology, Baqir al-Olum University   ׀     sa.taleghani@bou.ac.ir

🞕 Taleghani, S. A. (2019). Absence Causation and a Critical Review of a Non-Realistic Theory. The Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(79), 97۔ 120. https://doi.org/ 10.22091/jptr-pfk.2019.3417.1924.



 

🞕

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • absence causation
  • causal anti-realism
  • causal realism
  • Helen Beebeee
  • Donald Davidson
  • David Lewis

-  Armstrong, D. M. (1999). The open door: counterfactual versus singularist theories of causation. In Sankey H. (Ed.), Causation and laws of nature (pp. 175-185). Dordrecht: Springer.

-  Armstrong, D. M. (2004). Going through the Open Door Again: Counterfactual versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Collins, J. D., Hall, E. J., Hall, N., & Paul, L. A. (Eds.), Causation and counterfactuals. (pp. 445۔457(. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

-  Aronson, J. (1971). On the Grammar of Cause. Synthese, 22(3-4), 414–430. doi: 10.1007/BF00413436

-  Beebee, H. (2004). Causing and Nothingness. In Collins, J. Ned Hall & L. A. Paul. (Ed.), Causation and Counterfactuals. (pp. 291۔308). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

-  Bennet, J. (1995). The Act Itself. New York: Clarendon.

-  Campbell, N. (2003). Causes and causal explanations: Davidson and his critics. Philosophia, 31(1-2), 149۔157. doi:10.1007/BF02380929

-  Collins, J. Ned Hall & L. A. Paul. (ed.) (2004). Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

-  Davidson, D. (1993). Thinking Causes. In Heil, J. & Mele, A. (Ed.), Mental Causation. (pp. 3۔17). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-  Dowe, P. (1999). Good Connections: Causation and Causal Processes. in Sankey H. (Ed.), Causation and laws of nature (pp. 263۔274). Springer, Dordrecht.

-  Dowe, P. (2000). Physical Causation, New York: Cambridge University Press.

-  Dowe, P. (2001). A counterfactual theory of prevention and 'Causation' by omission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 79(2), 216۔226. doi:10.1080/713659223

-  Dowe, P. (2004). Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes. In Hitchcock, Ch. (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 189۔196). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

-  Dowe, P. (2009). Absences, Possible Causation and the Problem of Non۔locality. The Monist. 92(1), 23-40. doi:10.5840/monist20099212

-  Ehring, D. (1997). Causation and Persistence. New York: Oxford University Press.

-  Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. Erkenntnis, 14(3), 219–250. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00174894

-  Fetzer, J. H. (ed.). (1988). Probability and Causality. Boston: Reidel.

-  Glover, J. (1977). Causing Death and Saving Lives. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

-  Goldman, A. I. (1977). Perceptual Objects. Synthese, 35(3), 257–284. doi:10.1007/BF00485548

-  Hall, N. (2004). Two Concepts of Causation. In Collins, J. Ned Hall & L. A. Paul. (Ed.), Causation and Counterfactuals. (pp. 225-276). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

-  Hart, H. & Honore, T. (1985). Causation in the Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-  Hitchcock, Ch. (Ed.). (2004). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden. MA: Blackwell.

-  Hunt, I. (2005). Omissions and Preventions as Cases of Genuine Causation. Philosophical Papers, 34 (2), 209۔233. doi:10.1080/05568640509485156

-  Lewis, D. (1986). Postscripts to ‘Causation’. In Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2. (pp. 172-214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-  Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical Papers. (Vol. 2). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-  Lewis, D. (2000). Causation as Influence. The Journal of Philosophy. 97(4), 182-197. doi:10.2307/2678389

-  Lewis, D. (2004). Causation as Influence. In Collins, J. Ned Hall & L. A. Paul. (Ed.), Causation and Counterfactuals. (pp. 75–106). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

-  McGrath, S. (2005). Causation by Omission: A Dilemma. Philosophical Studies, 123 (1-2), 125–148. doi:10.1007/s11098-004-5216-z

-  Mellor, D. H. (1988). On Raising the Chance of Effects. In Fetzer, J. H. (Ed.), Probability and Causality. (pp. 229–240) Boston: Reidel.

-  Mellor, D. H. (1995). The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.

-  Mellor, D. H. (2004). For Facts as Causes and Efects. In Collins, J. Ned Hall & L. A. Paul. (Ed.), Causation and Counterfactuals. (pp. 309۔323). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

-  Mullany, N. (1992). Common sense Causation۔An Australian View. Oxford journal of Legal Studies. 12(3), 421۔439. doi: 10.1093/ojls/12.3.431

-  Persson, J. (2002). Cause, Effect & Fake Causation. Synthese. 131(1), 129۔143. doi: 10.1023/A:1015055126092

-  Reiber, S. D. (2002). Causation as Property Acquisition. Philosophical Studies, 109(1), 53-74. doi: 10.1023/A:1015721428268

-  Sankey, H. (ed.) (1999). Causation and Laws of Nature. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

-  Schaffer, J. (2000). Causation by Disconnection,. Philosophy of Science, 67(2), 285۔300. doi: 10.1086/392776

-  Schaffer, Jonathan (2004). Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation. In Hitchcock, Ch. (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 197--216). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

-  Sorensen, R. (1999). Seeing Intersecting Eclipses. Journal of Philosophy. 96(1), 25-49. doi: 10.2307/2564647

-  Stapleton, J. (1994). Product Liability. London: Butterworths.

-  Tooley, M. (1990). Causation: Reductionism versus Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, suppl., 50, 215۔236. doi: 10.2307/2108040

-  Tye, M. (1982). A Causal Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Review. 42(3), 311۔325. doi: 10.2307/2107488.

 

CAPTCHA Image