عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]چکیده [English]
Based on the description of the real structure of our conception of the world, P. F.
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, similar to Kant’s empirical Realism, deals with
determining the limitations of empirical knowledge of the world. In this case, Kant’s
transcendental Idealism seems to be an incoherent doctrine which can yield a
skepticism which the critical philosophy seeks to solve. Strawson rejects Kant’s
Transcendental Idealism in that it considers two limits, which leads to the paradox of
delimitation. Yet, the question is: Can Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics depict the
limitations of our knowledge without considering both limits? It seems that he has
adopted a language that chains us to some metaphysical constraint, which is opposed
to the sketch of the descriptive metaphysics. Thus, he is engaged in the same
paradox which he discovered in Kant. It seems that thinking on the limit is
essentially paradoxical; so skepticism can not be solved by appealing to it.