نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه فلسفه دین، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه تهران
2 دانشیار گروه فلسفۀ دین دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This paper examines two major critiques of positivity theories, Malcolm and Scott’s critique and axiological critiques concerning on preferring God’s existence, and evaluates their implications for desire-based theories of faith. Malcolm and Scott show that faith can persist even in the absence of desire, inclination, or a positive evaluation toward the content of faith. These examples undermine the claim that desire is conceptually necessary for faith and demonstrate that the linguistic and intuitive arguments of positivity theorists are insufficient. Next, axiological judgments regarding the desire that God exists are considered. Anti-theistic arguments based on personal goods, such as privacy or autonomy, are limited and cannot compete with the broad and impersonal goods attributed to theism, such as cosmic justice, the absence of gratuitous evil, the foundation of morality, and objective meaning. However, even if these challenges pose difficulties for some desire-based accounts, they cannot undermine or invalidate the component of positive evaluation and desirability, which is the core shared element across all versions of positivity theory. The paper further shows that the True Grit view, A complete account of faith must place practical commitment and the agent’s resilience at the center and not treat positive attitudes as necessary component.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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