نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
هیات علمی دانشگاه تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
We can clearly conceive hypothetical creature that are physically identical to humans but lack phenomenal consciousness. Can such zombies or robots that lack phenomenal consciousness be conscious in some other ways? Some contemporary analytic philosophers, including Tyler Burge say no. He holds that such entities are impossible, though he does not know how to defend this view. (Burge, 2007: p. 386) I will attempt to show how a rationalist line of thought may clarify and respond to the complicated question. In the first part, I introduce and defend Avicenna’s distinction between consciousness by nature and consciousness by acquisition. In the second part I explain how this distinction may help us to explain why phenomenal consciousness is the core notion of consciousness. The third part will concentrate on a distinction between consciousness and attention in Avicenna and Burge’s points of view. In the next part I argue why we should agree that phenomenally conscious states are reflexively present to persons. In the final part I offer an argument in defense of a non-reductionist conception of phenomenal consciousness. These five parts are to show how a deep dialogue between medieval and contemporary rationalists may shed light on such hard questions.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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