نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه فلسفه، دانشکدگان فارابی، دانشگاه تهران
2 دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران
3 گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This article develops a critique of David Chalmers’s property dualism from the standpoint of ontological monism. Chalmers, by proposing panprotopsychism, attempts to preserve the principle of the causal closure of physics while treating consciousness as a fundamental property that exists at the level of microparticles in the form of protophenomenal properties. In this account, the relation between macro level consciousness and micro states is explained through the grounding relation, without reducing consciousness to the physical body. However, this approach appears inadequate in resolving the relation between consciousness and the body. The critique developed here is grounded in a renewed understanding of the body. Ontological monism, centered on the notion of the pre noetic body, argues that consciousness is not the outcome of the composition of fundamental particles but rather a mode of the body’s being-in-the-world. The pre noetic body, in an ontological relation of availableness with the biological body, constitutes the first person structure of consciousness through proprioception, kinesthetic perception, and ecological experience. From this perspective, Chalmers’s explanation faces three major difficulties: an abstract and reductionist approach to the body, ambiguity in explaining the relation of grounding, and an inability to account for the first person phenomenal perspective.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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