نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
McCabe Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Coe College, USA
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
In this essay I consider the prospects for AI becoming persons deserving of all the same rights and responsibilities as human persons. In doing so, I consider two classic essays by William Lycan and John Searle. I agree with Lycan that a properly programmed AI could have free will, but I argue for a different account of this possibility. I also argue that Searle gives good reason to harbor doubts about the personhood of any future AI. Because of these doubts and the implications of AI personhood, I argue that we should not build AI that for all we know may or may not be persons.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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