نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
Independent Researcher, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
I take up the criterion for axiomhood that Rezaee, Mohammadinia, and Imam-Jom'eh (2025) reconstruct from Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā: a proposition is axiomatic just in case affirming, denying, or doubting it presupposes its own truth. Call this the Triadic Criterion. But defending it means first granting what does not yet work in the form its authors gave it. Its label, “intersubjective,” invites a social-epistemic reading the authors themselves reject. Its third component, doubt, is never shown to be independent of its second, denial, so the test risks being dyadic under a triadic name. And nothing in the original statement fixes what kind of necessity the criterion is supposed to deliver.
I argue that a revision addresses all three difficulties. Stratified into an independent first-order test on denial and a second-order test on suspension, and renamed the Transcendental-Pragmatic Approach to the Validation of Axioms (TPAVA), the criterion acquires exact modal content — pragmatic necessity, weaker than logical or metaphysical necessity but no less rigorous for that — and it reaches, as its unrevised predecessor did not, past the ontological axioms Rezaee et al. discuss into the axioms of formal logic itself, including modus ponens and the law of identity.
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