نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
استادیار، گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the “eternal recurrence of the same” is interpreted either as a cosmological hypothesis about the world's structure or as an existential-ethical test of one’s capacity to affirm life. Despite their differences, both readings confront a common question: What does “the same” mean in recurrence? Does recurrence require the world's numerical identity, cycles, a life, or a person? This article argues that both interpretations rest on an assumption: that recurrence requires the numerical identity of an entity, state, or person over time. The incompatibility between becoming—which guarantees no unchanging continuity of any entity—and recurrence arises not from the doctrine itself but from this identification. Drawing on the distinction between diachronic and synchronic identity, I argue that recurrence concerns not the continuity of a fixed essence across cycles, but the reoccurrence of an identical configuration of qualities and relations. Heraclitean becoming is thus not an alternative to recurrence but the context in which recurrence becomes intelligible as the cyclical form of becoming itself. In the ethical-narrative reading, the self can likewise be understood as an identity formed in life, rather than a pre-given substance, without requiring immutable diachronic identity.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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