Agency and Virtues

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه قم

چکیده

Zahra khazaei*
Received: 01/07/2019     |       Accepted: 11/09/2019
In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally. This article studies the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and intention? Or are virtues necessary merely for the moral or epistemic character of the agent and not his agency? If virtues are constructive elements of personal identity, can we say that virtues are necessary for action and agency? If we accept that virtues play a role in agency, the principle of “Ought Implies Can” makes us face a new challenge; which we will discuss. After explaining the concept of action and agency, I will study the relationship between agency and virtues in the field of ethics and epistemology. Ultimately, I conclude that not only in theories of virtue but also in other ethical theories, virtue is independently necessary for the actualization of agency; even if, conceptually, there might not be any relation between the two. In many cases, virtue can also have a crucial role in prudential agency.

 


* Ph.D., Professor. Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.        ׀      Z-khazaei@qom.ac.ir

🞕 khazaei. Z. (2019). Agency and Virtues. The Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(81), 119-140.  doi: 10.22091/jptr.2019.4673.2190.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Agency and Virtues

نویسنده [English]

  • Zahra Khazaei
Ph.D., Professor. Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Zahra khazaei*
Received: 01/07/2019     |       Accepted: 11/09/2019
In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally. This article studies the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and intention? Or are virtues necessary merely for the moral or epistemic character of the agent and not his agency? If virtues are constructive elements of personal identity, can we say that virtues are necessary for action and agency? If we accept that virtues play a role in agency, the principle of “Ought Implies Can” makes us face a new challenge; which we will discuss. After explaining the concept of action and agency, I will study the relationship between agency and virtues in the field of ethics and epistemology. Ultimately, I conclude that not only in theories of virtue but also in other ethical theories, virtue is independently necessary for the actualization of agency; even if, conceptually, there might not be any relation between the two. In many cases, virtue can also have a crucial role in prudential agency.

 


* Ph.D., Professor. Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.        ׀      Z-khazaei@qom.ac.ir

🞕 khazaei. Z. (2019). Agency and Virtues. The Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(81), 119-140.  doi: 10.22091/jptr.2019.4673.2190.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Keywords: agency
  • action
  • moral virtue
  • epistemic virtue
  • the principle of “Ought Implies Can”

مراجع

-  
Aguilar, J. H., & Buckareff, A. (2015). A Gradualist Metaphysics of Agency. In A. Buckareff, C. Moya,Rosell (Eds.), Agency, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility (pp. 30–43). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137414953_3
Anscombe, G. (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press. Reprinted in ,1963 Oxford: Blackwell and in , 2000 Harvard University Press
Aristotle (2000). Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (R. Crisp, Trans.). Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. E. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. E. (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625190
Dancy, J. (2004). Two Ways of Explaining Actions. In H. Steward & J. Hyman (Eds.), Agency and Action (pp. 25–42). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511550843.003
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 685–700. https://doi.org/10.2307/2023177; Reprinted in: Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press Clarendon Press.
Davidson, D. (1969). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 21–42.
Davidson, D. (1971). Agency. In R. W. Binkley, R. N. Bronaugh, & A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 1–37). University of Toronto Press. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442656963-002, Reprinted in Davidson, D. (2001). Agency. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 43–61). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1978). Intending. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action Papers Presented at the First Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (pp. 41–60). D. Reidel. Reprinted in Davidson, D. (1980). Agency. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 83–102). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (2001). Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation. In M. Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and
Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (pp. 77 –92). Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M. (2006). My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Pres.
Fischer, J. M. (2007). Compatibilism. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four Views on Free Will (1st edition, pp.44-84). USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Flanagan, O., & Rorty, A. O. (Eds.). (1990). Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge: A Bradford Book.
Frankfurt, H. G. (2003). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. In M. McKenna & D. Widerker (Eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (1st edition, pp. 17–25). USA: Routledge.
Ginet, C. (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press.
Harris, S. (2012). Free Will (1st edition). NY. USA: Free Press.
Holton, R. (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. Journal of Philosophy, 96(5), 241. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564667
Hornsby, J. (2004). Agency and Actions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 55, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008614
Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jacobs, J. (2001). Choosing Character: Responsibility for Virtue and Vice (1st edition). N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Kane, R. (2007). Libertarianism. In J. M. Fischer, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four Views on Free Will (1st edition, pp. 4–45). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kant, I. (2002). Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Khazaei, Z. (2011). Moral Generalism or Particularism? Philosophy Study, 1(4), 247–257.
Khazaei, Z., & Tamadon, F. (2013). Compatibilism, A Bridge Between Determinism and Free Will. Journal of Religious Thought : A Quarterly Journal of Shiraz University, 13(46), 21–46. https://doi.org/10.22099/jrt.2013.2440
Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.
Korsgaard, C. M. (2019). Constitutivism and the Virtues. Philosophical Explorations, 22(2), 98–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2019.1599050
Levy, N. (2002). Are We Responsible for Our Characters? Ethic - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy, 1(2), 115–132.
Lowe, E. J. (2008). Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action (1st edition). Oxford University Press.
McCann, H. J. (2013). Action. In International Encyclopedia of Ethics (pp. 38–48). Blackwell Publishing Ltd. doi/10.1002/9781444367072
Mele, A. (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies, 150(3), 391–404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9418-2
Mele, A. R. (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (1st edition). Oxford University Press.
Mizrahi, M. (2009). ‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can.’ Philosophical Frontiers, 4(1), 19–35.
Mizrahi, M. (2012). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ From an Epistemic Point of View? Philosophia, 40(4), 829–840. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9389-y
Moody-Adams, M. (1990). On the old saw that character is destiny. In O. Flanagan & A. O. Rorty (Eds.), Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology (New edition, pp. 111–131). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Moya, C. (2006). Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Scepticism (1st edition). New York: Routledge.
Murphy, N. (2006). Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Illustrated edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, N., & Brown, W. S. (2007). Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?: Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Illustrated edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press, U.S.A.
Pereboom, D. (2007). Hard Incompatibilism. In J. M. Fischer, R. Kane, D. Pereboom, & M. Vargas (Eds.), Four Views on Free Will (1st edition, pp.191-203). USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Runyan, J. (2013). Human Agency and Neural Causes: Philosophy of Action and the Neuroscience of Voluntary Agency. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schlosser, M. (2019). Agency. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/
Sebo, J. (2015). Agency and Moral Status. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 14(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810046
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1984). `Ought’ Conversationally Implies `Can’. Philosophical Review, 93(2), 249–261. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184585
Slote, M. (2001). Morals from Motives (1st edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slote, M. (2007). The Ethics of Care and Empathy (1st edition). Oxford: Routledge.
Sosa, E. (1980). The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00394.x
Sosa, E. (2009). A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I (1st edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2015a). Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. (2015b). Virtue Epistemology. In M. Alfano (Ed.), Current Controversies in Virtue Theory (1st edition, pp. 47–62). New York: Routledge.
Trianosky, G. (1990). Natural affection and responsibility for character: A critique of Kantian views of the virtues. In O. Flanagan & A. O. Rorty (Eds.), Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology (New edition, pp. 93–109). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Vranas, P. B. M. (2007). I Ought, Therefore I Can. Philosophical Studies, 136(2), 167–216. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9071-6
Watson, G. (1975). Free Agency. Journal of Philosophy, 72(April), 205–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024703
Williams, B. (1976). Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. A. O., & Nagel, T. (1976). Moral Luck. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 50, 115–151.
Wolf, S. (2012). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Ethical Theory: An Anthology (2nd ed., pp. 363–373). Wiley-Blackwell.
Zagzebski, L. (2010). Exemplarist Virtue Theory. Metaphilosophy, 41(1–2), 41–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01627.x
Zagzebski, L. (2012). Virtue Theory and Exemplars. Philosophical News, 4, 156–161.
Zagzebski, L. T. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Recent Printing edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Zimmerman, M. J. (1996). The Concept of Moral Obligation. , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله
CAPTCHA Image

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار