The Skepticism of Skeptical Theism

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

* Ph.D. in Philosophy, Professor of Religion and of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Rochester, NY, USA,

چکیده

Edward Wierenga*
 
Skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’s existence.   The skeptical theist declines to accept a premise of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is justified in permitting certain evils or about the conditional probability that the world contains as much evil as it does, or evils of a particular sort, on the hypothesis that God exists. Skeptical theists are thus not supposed to be skeptical about theism; rather, they are theists who are skeptical about something else. But that raises the question of exactly what else. In particular, does skepticism with respect to some claims about God and evil lead to a more pervasive skepticism? More precisely, is skeptical theism committed to additional skepticism about God? Is skeptical theism committed to global skepticism, including skepticism about ordinary, commonplace beliefs? Or is skeptical theism at the very least committed to a broader skepticism about matters of morality? This paper takes up these questions.
 


* Ph.D. in Philosophy, Professor of Religion and of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Rochester, NY, USA, Email: edward.     ׀    wierenga@rochester.edu

🞕 Wierenga, E. (2019). The Skepticism of Skeptical Theism. The Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(81), pp. 27۔ 42.  doi: 10.22091/jptr.2019.4608.2171.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Skepticism of Skeptical Theism

نویسنده [English]

  • Edward Wierenga
* Ph.D. in Philosophy, Professor of Religion and of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Rochester, NY, USA,
چکیده [English]

Skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’s existence. The skeptical theist declines to accept a premiss of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is justified in permitting certain evils or about the conditional probability that the world contains as much evil as it does, or evils of a particular sort, on the hypothesis that God exists. Skeptical theists are thus not supposed to be skeptical about theism; rather, they are theists who are skeptical about something else. But that raises the question of exactly what else. In particular, does skepticism with respect to some claims about God and evil lead to a more pervasive skepticism? More precisely, is skeptical theism committed to additional skepticism about God? Is skeptical theism committed to global skepticism, including skepticism about ordinary, commonplace beliefs? Or is skeptical theism at the very least committed to a broader skepticism about matters of morality? This paper takes up these questions.

Skeptical theism , Global Skepticism ,Moral Skepticism,God’s existence, Problem of Evil.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Skeptical theism
  • evil
  • the problem of evil
  • Rowe

مراجع

-  Alston, W. (1991). The Inductive argument from evil and the human cognitive condition. Philosophical Perspectives 5, 29-67. 10.2307/2214090
-  Alston, W. (1996). Some (temporarily) final thoughts on evidential arguments from evil. In Howard-Snyder, D. (Ed.). The Evidential argument from evil (pp. 311-332). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
-  Calvin, J. (1969). Institutes of the Christian religion. (Ed.) McNeill J. T. (Trans.) Battles, F. L. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. (Original work published 1559).
-  Dougherty, T. & McBrayer, J. P. (Eds.). Skeptical theism: new essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-  Draper, P. (1989) Pain and pleasure: an evidential problem for theists. Noûs 23, 331-350. 10.2307/2215486.
-  Gale, R. (1996). Some difficulties in theistic treatments of evil. In Howard-Snyder, D. (Ed.). The Evidential argument from evil (pp. 206-218). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
-  Hasker, W. (2004). Providence, evil and the openness of god. London and New York: Routledge.
-  Howard-Snyder, D. (1996). The Argument from inscrutable evil. In Howard-Snyder, D. (Ed.). The Evidential argument from evil (pp. 286-310). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
-  Hume, D. (1947). Dialogues concerning natural religion. N.K. Smith (Ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
-  Mackie, J. L. (1955) Evil and Omnipotence. Mind 64, 200-212. 10.1093/mind/lxiv.254.200.
-  Mill, J. S. (2001). Utilitarianism (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (Original work published 1863).
-  Plantinga, A. (1977). God, freedom, and evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans. (Original work published 1974).
-  Plantinga, A. (1967). God and other minds. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
-  Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-  Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-  Pojman, L. & Rea, M. (Eds.) (2015). Philosophy of religion: an anthology (7th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2015.
-  Ross, W. D. (2002). The Right and the good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1930).
-  Rowe, W. (1979). The Problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16, 335-341.
-  Rowe, W. (1988). Evil and Theodicy. Philosophical Topics 16,119-132. 10.5840/philtopics198816216.
-  Rowe, W. (1991). Ruminations about Evil. Philosophical Perspectives, 5, 69-88, 10.2307/2214091.
-  Rowe, W. (1996). The Evidential argument from evil: a second look. In Howard-Snyder, D. (Ed.). The Evidential argument from evil (pp. 262-285). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
-  Russell, B. (1989). The Persistent problem of evil. Faith and Philosophy 6, 121-139. 10.5840/faithphil19896221.
-  Russell, B. (1996). Defenseless. In Howard-Snyder, D. (Ed.). The Evidential argument from evil (pp. 193-205). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
-  Swinburne, R. (1998). Providence and the problem of evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-  Van Inwagen, P. (1991). The Problem of evil, the problem of air, and the problem of silence. Philosophical Perspectives 5,135-165. 10.2307/2214093
-  Volf, M. (2006). Free of charge: giving and forgiving in a culture stripped of grace. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
-  Wierenga, E. (2016). The Philosophy of religion. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
-  Wykstra, S. (1984). The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16, 73-94. 10.1007/BF00136567.
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله
CAPTCHA Image

فایل ها

هم رسانی

ارجاع به این مقاله

آمار