Nature and Existence of Time and Its Theological Implications in Avicenna’s View

Abstract

The nature and existence of time is a major issue in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna is a philosopher who presented various discussions of the problem in different works, trying to explain the problem of time and its relation with other things such as motion and distance (masāfat). In his major philosophical books, Remarks and Admonitions (al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt), The Book of Healing (al-Shifāʾ), and The Book of Salvation (al-Najāt), Avicenna examines and explains the nature and manner of existence of time, but he does not isolate the theological consequences of his account. An account of such consequences can reveal his view of the matter. In fact, it is essential to see how definitions of time would affect views of theological problems, as it can clarify the intellectual-philosophical system of philosophers. In this article, I draw on the analytic-descriptive method to offer an accurate picture of the nature and existence of time in Avicenna’s view, and then explicate four consequences of that definition for theological problems.

When humans encounter the external world and its phenomena, not only do they examine and try to know the phenomena, they are also concerned with relations between entities and how they affect each other. In fact, discovery of new truths, theory construction, and presentation of various models of the natures of things are not only interesting in themselves, are peculiar characteristics of inquisitive humans, who devote their intellectual life to acquisition of a proper understanding of the phenomena in the external world. Such efforts have resulted in all sorts of discoveries that mesmerize people and provide them with lives that are more comfortable.Philosophers have a significant place among intellectuals who try to discover the natures of things and their relations. Notwithstanding their use of, and respect for, empirical achievements, philosophers never rest content with experimental results and do not confine the reality of things to their material dimension. For this reason, they discuss how a material entity can be related to non-material entities, and articulate the results of their research in the form of general principles. To do so, the philosopher should go through a number of stages. She begins with a classification of things by reflection on their specific and common properties, and then determines general concepts in reference to those properties—the so-called genera and differentia of things. She then introduces other things as “accidents” or accidental properties (al-Kindī, 1978, p. 62; Ibn Sīnā, 1953, vol. 2, p. 128; Fakhr al-Rāzī, 2002, p. 123; Mīrdāmād, 2002, vol. 1, p. 164; Mullā Ṣadrā, 1989, vol. 4, p. 185). In this way, the fundamental concepts of substance and accidents are obtained, which have been a focus of philosophical reflections throughout history.For a more convenient study of entities and phenomena in the world, philosophers have classified them, say, into substances and accidents, which are in turn divided into various categories (al-Kindī, 1978, p. 68; Ibn Sīnā, 1953, vol. 1, p. 41; Fakhr al-Rāzī, 1990, vol. 1, pp. 137-142). The category of “quantity” (al-kamm) is a subcategory of accidents. There are two kinds of quantities: continuous (muttaṣil) and discontinuous (munfaṣil), where the former is divided in turn into two other subcategories: static (qārr) and non-static (ghayr al-qārr). A static continuous quantity is one whose parts are co-present, while non-static continuous quantity is one whose parts are not co-present; rather, existence of one part is conditional upon the nonexistence of the previous part. The non-static continuous quantity is “time,” because each part of time can exist only if the previous part ceases to exist.