نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
1 گروه فلسفه دین دانشکده الهیات . معارف اسلامی دانشگاه تهران
2 دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی دانشگاه تهران
عنوان مقاله [English]
In a new formulation of the logical problem of evil, J. L. Schellenberg attempts to develop a new version of the logical form of problem of evil through logical inconsistency of the conjunction of three theistic claims with the existence of evil. Schellenberg by appealing to three commitments of theism: Unsurpassable Greatness (UG), Ontological Independence (OI) and Prior Purity (PP) adopts two approaches the Modeling and the Motivation to demonstrate the inconsistency of the conjunction of three theistic claims with the existence of evil. To pursue this aim, Schellenberg develops his argument by adding supplementary propositions to the four claims. Therefore, what is shown from the conjunction of three theistic claims and additional propositions is that there is no evil in the world, whereas this is logically inconsistent with the existence of evil in the world.
This paper through an analytical-critical approach aims to show Schellenberg’s argument is not sound. To show its falsity, this paper has focused on premise (8) as the central premise of Schellenberg’s argument. By showing its falsity, it would also be vulnerable to the free will defense. In addition to Gellman’s critique over premise (8), this paper also poses a dilemma over (8) to show Schellenberg’s argument is not sound and it cannot avoid Plantinga’s rebuttal.
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