Evaluating Strong Emergentism: An Argument for Non-Physical Substantial Strong Emergentism

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 PhD of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

چکیده

Physicalists and dualists have failed to provide a convincing answer to the mind-body problem. This is because they, respectively, sacrifice mental causation and neglect the close relationship between the mind and the body. To tackle this, some contemporary philosophers, such as Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the concept of strong emergentism. This perspective views the mind as an emergent physical substance with autonomous causal powers. If this standpoint is tenable, it holds promise for resolving the mind-body problem. Nevertheless, the idea of strong emergentism faces substantial challenges. This article aims to achieve two objectives. First, it addresses these challenges and asserts that, even in the face of the most serious concern, “the collapse problem”, a specific interpretation of strong emergentism remains unthreatened. Second, we contend that while O’Connor and Jacobs present a thought-provoking proposal, its clarity is hindered, and a thorough understanding is only possible when we perceive the emergent substance as more than merely physical.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Evaluating Strong Emergentism: An Argument for Non-Physical Substential Strong Emergentism

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Mehdipour 1
  • Abdolrasoul Kashfi 2
1 PhD of Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2 Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Physicalists and dualists have been unable to give a convincing answer to the mind-body problem, because they sacrifice, respectively, the mental causation and the close relationship between mind and body. Consequently, some recent philosophers, like Timothy O'Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, have turned to the idea of strong emergentism considereing the mind as an emergent but physical substance that has independent causal powers. If this answer is defensible, it will be a promising approach to solve the mind-body problem. However, there are significant challenges facing the idea of strong emergentism. In this article, we have two objectives: firstly, to address these challenges and to show that even the most serious one, the Collapse Problem, cannot threaten a particular understanding of strong emergentism. Secondly, we argue that O'Connor and Jacobs's proposal, although thought-provoking, is not comprehensible and can only be understood clearly when we consider the emergent substance to be not merely physical.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Strong Emergentism
  • Mind-Body problem
  • O'Connor and Jacobs
  • Substance Dualsim
  • Physicalism
  • Mental Causation
  • Substance and Property

مراجع

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Hasker, W. (2018) The case for emergent dualism. In J. Loose, A. Menuge, & J. P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to substance dualism (pp. 62-72). Wiley Blackwell.
Heil, J. (2012). The universe as we find it. Clarendon Press.
Heil, J. (2017). Downward causation. In M. Paolini, & P. and F. Orilia (Eds.), Philosophical and scientific perspectives on downward causation (pp. 42-53). Routledge.
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Lowe, E, J. (2010). Substance dualism: a non-Cartesian approach. In R. C. Koons & G. Bealer (Eds.), The waning of materialism (pp. 439-461). Oxford University Press.
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O’Connor, T. (2020). Emergent Properties. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.). URL=       
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/properties-emergent/>.
O’Connor, T., & Jacobs, J. D. (2003). Emergent individuals. The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(213), 540-555.
O’Connor, T., & Wong, H. Y. (2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Nous, 39(4), 658-678.
Rickabaugh, B. L. (2018). Against emergent dualism. In J. J. Loose, A. J. L. Menuge, & J. P. Moreland (Eds.), The Blackwell companion to substance dualism
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Searle, J. (1992). The rediscovery of the mind. MIT Press.
Taylor, E. (2015). Collapsing Emergence. Philosophical Quarterly, 65, 732-753.
 
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پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی
دوره 26، شماره 1
فروردین 1403
صفحه 67-84

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