Subjective Holism and the Problem of Consciousness

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 Ph.D. in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran

10.22091/jptr.2024.10773.3062

چکیده

How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, that is, dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem of consciousness and the explanation of how our unconscious physical (matter) part (substance) is related to our conscious mental part (substance). If the problem of consciousness is the result of such views (eliminativism and dualism), is it possible to adopt a different perspective so that the problem does not arise at all? Or find a solution for it (maximum answer) or at least determine the right way to solve the problem (minimum answer)? The current research goes into this issue by adopting subjectivism and holism to make its subjective holism theory. Therefore, it gives a positive (maximum and minimum) answer to the above questions.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Subjective Holism and the Problem of Consciousness.

نویسندگان [English]

  • Siamak Abdollahi 1
  • Mansour Nasiri 2
1 Ph.D. in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
چکیده [English]

How does unconscious matter become conscious? How does our physical part, which lacks consciousness, have such a subjective quality? This is the explanatory gap in the problem of consciousness or the hard problem of consciousness which comes from a physicalist (eliminativist physicalism) point of view. From the opposite point of view, i.e. dualism, the mind-body problem has led to the problem of consciousness and the explanation of how our unconscious physical (matter) part (substance) is related to our conscious mental part (substance). If the problem of consciousness is the result of such views (eliminativism and dualism), is it possible to adopt a different perspective so that the problem does not arise at all? Or find a solution for it (maximum answer) or at least determine the right way to solve the problem (minimum answer)? The current research goes to this issue by adopting subjectivism and holism to make its subjective holism theory. Therefore, it gives a positive (maximum and minimum) answer to the above questions.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Holism
  • Subjectivism
  • Problem of Consciousness
  • Explanatory Gap
  • Explanatory Power
  • Downward Causation

مراجع

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پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی
دوره 26، شماره 3
مهر 1403
صفحه 135-150

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