What is it Really Like to be a Human? A Holistic-Subjective Response

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Research Fellow at the Department of Philosophy, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran.

2 Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran

Abstract

What does it really mean to be human? In this context, “real” refers to the most precise comprehension of human experience from a subjective and phenomenological perspective. When exploring human nature in the realm of philosophy of mind, we confront not only the mind-body problem (a fundamental challenge in substance dualism) and the hard problem of consciousness (a hurdle for eliminativism) but also the explanatory gaps that stem from an objective and partitive interpretation of human nature. What if we were to shift this perspective to one that is the aspective-holistic and subjective viewpoint? The principal aim of this paper is to argue that subjectivism requires a holistic perspective to effectively confront eliminativism. The authors propose a shift in perspective, labeling it “Subjective Holism,” which is not a definitive solution to the issues at hand; rather, it serves as a framework for understanding human nature. This approach aligns with our intuition–considering oneself subjectively as a whole–and possesses enhanced explanatory power by treating humans as integrated complex systems. It clarifies how mental and physical states emerge as properties within this system. Through a holistic-subjective approach, the query about human nature evolves into: How do I, as a unified whole with various aspects, possess qualia such as insideness and uniqueness, which are exclusive to the subject’s conscious experiences? As a human being, I exist as a complex system (whole) with real conscious experience as my high-level and emergent property.

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Journal of Philosophical Theological Research
Volume 27, Issue 3 - Serial Number 105
September 2025
Pages 91-114

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