نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران، تهران. ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
This article offers a critical re-examination of the theory of mental existence (wujūd dhihnī) in the thought of the two Zunūzī theosophers—Mullā ‘Abdullāh Zunūzī and his son Āqā ‘Alī Mudarris Zunūzī—within the framework of their radical interpretation of the Primacy of Existence (aṣālat al-wujūd). While the classical account of mental existence relies on the presence of the very quiddity (māhiyyah) in both external and mental realms, the Zunūzīs’ ontology denies any external realization to quiddity, viewing it as a purely conceptual representation of the limits of existence. To reconcile this tension, they reconstruct the theory by shifting the ontological locus to the “existence of knowledge” (wujūd al-‘ilm), redefining “representation” (ḥikāyat) as a relation between quidditative concepts and external existence, and “correspondence” (muṭābaqat) as conformity to existential and non-existential limits. A notable innovation is the extension of mental existence to pure intelligibles and even the Necessary Existent. However, this reconstruction generates internal inconsistencies, particularly regarding the instantiation of limited quiddities (bi-sharṭ-i lā) within simple, unconditional existence. Āqā ‘Alī later modifies his position by introducing the “dependent establishment” (thubūt-i tabi‘ī) of quiddities in the divine realm. The study demonstrates both the philosophical dynamism and the unresolved tensions in the Zunūzīs’ synthesis of radical ontology and functional epistemology.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)
ارسال نظر در مورد این مقاله