جایگاه‌ «تروّی» در اندیشۀ فارابی و کارکردهای نظری و عملی آن 

This article investigates the concept of tarawwi (deliberation) in Abu Nasr al-Farabi’s philosophy and its central role in moral agency and ethical action. Farabi, the “Second Teacher,” develops practical reason as the pivotal faculty for ethical decision-making, employing tarawwi as a rational process to determine the best course of action in particular circumstances. Tarawwi consists of four stages: envisioning the end goal, evaluating possible options, assessing consequences, and selecting the optimal action that best realizes the intended good. By harmonizing universal principles (apprehended by practical intellect) with particular knowledge, and integrating cognition with desire, tarawwi bridges theory and practice. Unlike views limiting practical reason to particulars (e.g., Avicenna, Mulla Sadra), Farabi attributes to it independent epistemic access to universals, thus resolving Hume’s is-ought problem within practical syllogisms. Tarawwi also explains akrasia (weakness of will): once complete deliberation culminates in resolute choice, action necessarily follows. Strengthened through experience, repetition, and habituation, tarawwi fosters moral virtues within a virtue-ethical framework, leading to eudaimonia (happiness). The paper positions tarawwi as both a theoretical tool for understanding moral psychology and a practical strategy for ethical education and character development.
 
Keywords:
tarawwi, deliberation, practical reason, practical reasoning, akrasia, virtue ethics, happiness, Farabi


Introduction
In the history of Islamic philosophy, Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. 950 CE), known as the “Second Teacher” after Aristotle, made significant contributions to ethics by integrating Aristotelian practical wisdom with Islamic thought. Central to his moral philosophy is the concept of tarawwi (deliberation), which serves as the mechanism through which practical reason (ʿaql ʿamalī) operates to guide human action toward virtue and ultimate happiness (saʿādah). Unlike Plato, who viewed knowledge as sufficient for virtuous action, or certain later philosophers who restricted practical reason’s cognitive scope, Farabi emphasizes the active, deliberative role of practical intellect in specific moral contexts.
This extended abstract elucidates tarawwi’s definition, process, epistemic foundations, and its dual theoretical and practical functions based on Farabi’s key texts.
The Concept, Stages, and Process of Tarawwi
Farabi conceives tarawwi both as an act of practical reason and as a dispositional capacity or excellence (jūdat al-ruʾya) of the soul. Linguistically derived from “raʾy” (opinion/view), it denotes thoughtful reflection, foresight, and avoidance of haste. Technically, it is the intellectual process preceding voluntary action in particular situations to discern the most appropriate means to a worthy end.
The process unfolds in four distinct stages: (1) envisioning the goal or end (ghāyah), often informed by universal principles of the good and happiness; (2) identifying and examining possible courses of action within the given context; (3) evaluating the consequences and outcomes of each option in relation to the end; and (4) selecting and committing to the optimal action that most effectively achieves the virtuous goal. For example, a physician deliberates on treatment by keeping health as the end, weighing options, and choosing the best. Tarawwi synthesizes cognition and inclination, producing not merely judgment but a motivational state leading to action. It involves both universal knowledge (principles of ethics) and particular knowledge (contextual details), facilitated by faculties like imagination and estimation, but ultimately governed by practical reason. Farabi distinguishes it from theoretical reasoning, emphasizing its independence in structuring practical syllogisms. Deliberation is relative to circumstances yet guided by stable criteria of the mean (wasat), analogous to medicine’s pursuit of bodily equilibrium adapted to individual conditions.
Epistemic Scope, and Relation to Virtue and Happiness, and Akrasia
Farabi’s distinctive contribution lies in attributing to practical reason the ability to apprehend both universals and particulars independently. In practical syllogisms, practical reason formulates both major premises (universal ethical principles) and minor premises (particular circumstances), deriving prescriptive conclusions (“ought” statements) without deriving them solely from theoretical reason. This contrasts with Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, who often see practical reason as primarily operative and limited to particulars, deriving universals from theoretical intellect, and with thinkers like Ghazali who minimize its perceptual role. Consequently, Farabi avoids Hume’s “is-ought” fallacy, as the premises and conclusions remain within the homogeneous domain of practical intellect.
Theoretically, tarawwi provides a robust account of akrasia. Farabi distinguishes will (irādah) from choice (ikhtiyār), the latter arising from deliberation. Full tarawwi culminates in a resolute particular judgment and motivational impulse, making subsequent action inevitable as the final cause of the act. Weakness of will occurs when imagination or passion intervenes instead of complete deliberation. Thus, it bridges theory and practice.
In Farabi’s virtue ethics, happiness (saʿādah) is the flourishing of the human essence achieved through balanced soul faculties and moral virtues. Tarawwi is indispensable for acquiring virtues and attaining happiness, as it transforms general knowledge into particular, motivated action. Practically, tarawwi enables correct particular moral choices and is crucial for moral education. It is cultivated through experience (accumulating phantasms and estimative meanings), repetition leading to habituation (malakah), and training. In moral psychology terms, tarawwi integrates cognitive, motivational, and volitional dimensions, offering a model for contemporary ethical training. Educators and rulers must cultivate this faculty through guided practice rather than mere theoretical instruction.
Conclusion
Farabi’s analysis of tarawwi positions practical reason as an autonomous, perceptive, and executive faculty essential for moral life. By detailing its stages and epistemic reach, he offers a comprehensive solution to the challenges of ethical action, moral weakness, and the fact-value distinction. Strengthening tarawwi through habit and experience not only resolves the gap between moral knowledge and performance but also serves as an effective strategy for virtue cultivation and achieving true happiness. This framework remains relevant for contemporary virtue ethics and moral education, demonstrating the enduring depth of Farabi’s practical philosophy in harmonizing reason, desire, and action.