Reexamining Ibn Sīnā's Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: A Defense of the Avicennian Formulation Against the Critiques of Transcendent Philosophy

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران

2 استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران.

چکیده

The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, the most rigorous argument for God's existence in Islamic philosophy, has been formulated in various ways. After Mullā Ṣadrā, his formulation gained prominence, while Ibn Sīnā's original version faced three main criticisms from Transcendent Philosophy: that it is purely conceptual, that it relies on the refutation of infinite regress, and that it lacks distinction from the argument from essential possibility. This article reexamines Ibn Sīnā's formulation and defends its originality and sufficiency against these critiques. Through an analytical study of his primary texts, the article demonstrates that the charge of conceptuality arises from preconceptions about Ibn Sīnā's philosophy rather than a neutral reading of his work; that the proof does not depend on refuting infinite regress; and that it is an argument from existential poverty fundamentally distinct from essential possibility. The study further shows that Ibn Sīnā's proof satisfies all four criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: proceeding within the reality of existence, using self-evident premises, establishing the divine attributes, and requiring no appeal to divine acts. The article concludes that Ibn Sīnā's formulation does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā's and should be regarded as an authentic precursor to the proof in the fifth century AH.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

Peripatetic philosophy, Transcendent Philosophy, essential possibility, ontological poverty, God, Necessary Being, contingent being, infinite regress.

نویسندگان [English]

  • Mohammad Shafiei 1
  • Mohammad Zabihi 2
1 PhD student, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
2 Professor, Department of Philosophy and Islamic Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
چکیده [English]

The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, the most rigorous argument for God's existence in Islamic philosophy, has been formulated in various ways. After Mullā Ṣadrā, his formulation gained prominence, while Ibn Sīnā's original version faced three main criticisms from Transcendent Philosophy: that it is purely conceptual, that it relies on the refutation of infinite regress, and that it lacks distinction from the argument from essential possibility. This article reexamines Ibn Sīnā's formulation and defends its originality and sufficiency against these critiques. Through an analytical study of his primary texts, the article demonstrates that the charge of conceptuality arises from preconceptions about Ibn Sīnā's philosophy rather than a neutral reading of his work; that the proof does not depend on refuting infinite regress; and that it is an argument from existential poverty fundamentally distinct from essential possibility. The study further shows that Ibn Sīnā's proof satisfies all four criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: proceeding within the reality of existence, using self-evident premises, establishing the divine attributes, and requiring no appeal to divine acts. The article concludes that Ibn Sīnā's formulation does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā's and should be regarded as an authentic precursor to the proof in the fifth century AH.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Peripatetic philosophy
  • Transcendent Philosophy
  • essential possibility
  • ontological poverty
  • God
  • Necessary Being
  • contingent being
  • infinite regress
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پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی
دوره 28، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 107
جلد نشریه
فروردین 1405
صفحه 39-58

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