The Challenge of Agency in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Ontological Perspective

نوع مقاله : سر مقاله

نویسنده

استاد گروه فلسفه و کلام، دانشگاه قم ،قم، ایران

چکیده

The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence systems, particularly large language models, has significantly reshaped contemporary philosophical discussions of agency. What was once primarily situated within philosophy of mind has now become a central concern in philosophy of technology, metaphysics, and AI ethics. These systems exhibit increasingly sophisticated capacities for natural language generation, inferential simulation, and goal-directed behavior, thereby blurring the conceptual distinction between intelligent behavior and genuine agency. Within analytic philosophy, agency is typically analyzed in terms of intentionality, reason-responsiveness, and rational control. This editorial proposes a graded framework of agency and introduces the concept of the quasi-agent as a philosophical hypothesis. A quasi-agent is an entity that exhibits stable and often complex patterns of agent-like behavior without possessing ontological subjecthood or intrinsic intentionality. To deepen this distinction, the discussion draws on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy, particularly the doctrines of the primacy of existence, the gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd), and knowledge by presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī). From this perspective, agency is not merely a behavioral property but a mode of being. The editorial concludes that artificial intelligence should neither be classified as a full agent nor reduced to a mere instrument, but rather understood as a quasi-agentive entity that challenges prevailing philosophical frameworks of action, responsibility, and subjectivity.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Challenge of Agency in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Ontological Perspective

نویسنده [English]

  • Zahra Khazaei
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
چکیده [English]

The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence systems, particularly large language models, has significantly reshaped contemporary philosophical discussions of agency. What was once primarily situated within philosophy of mind has now become a central concern in philosophy of technology, metaphysics, and AI ethics. These systems exhibit increasingly sophisticated capacities for natural language generation, inferential simulation, and goal-directed behavior, thereby blurring the conceptual distinction between intelligent behavior and genuine agency. Within analytic philosophy, agency is typically analyzed in terms of intentionality, reason-responsiveness, and rational control. This editorial proposes a graded framework of agency and introduces the concept of the quasi-agent as a philosophical hypothesis. A quasi-agent is an entity that exhibits stable and often complex patterns of agent-like behavior without possessing ontological subjecthood or intrinsic intentionality. To deepen this distinction, the discussion draws on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Theosophy, particularly the doctrines of the primacy of existence, the gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd), and knowledge by presence (ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī). From this perspective, agency is not merely a behavioral property but a mode of being. The editorial concludes that artificial intelligence should neither be classified as a full agent nor reduced to a mere instrument, but rather understood as a quasi-agentive entity that challenges prevailing philosophical frameworks of action, responsibility, and subjectivity.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Agency
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Quasi-Agent
  • Intentionality
  • Subjectivity
  • Analytic Philosophy
  • Mullā Ṣadrā
  • Transcendent Theosophy
  • Moral Responsibility

مراجع

Reference Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press. Bratman, M. E. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press. Bratman, M. E. (1999). Faces of Intention. Cambridge University Press. Bubeck, S., et al. (2023). Sparks of artificial general intelligence: Early experiments with GPT-4. arXiv preprint. doi: 10.48550/arxiv.2303.12712 Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. Dennett, D. C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press. Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and Control. Cambridge University Press. Floridi, L. (2025). AI as agency without intelligence. Philosophy and Technology, 38(1), 30–38. Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5–20. doi: 10.2307/2024717 Gunkel, D. J. (2018). The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, and Ethics. MIT Press. Khazaei, Z. (2019). Agency and virtues. Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(3), 119–140. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2019.4673.2190 Mullā Ṣadrā. (1981). al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyah fi al-asfār al-arbaʿa (Vol. 2). Beirut. Onyeukaziri, J. N. (2023). Action and agency in artificial intelligence: A philosophical critique. Philosophia, 24(1), 73–90. Parıldar, S. (2020). Intentionality in Mullā Ṣadrā. Springer. Russell, S. (2019). Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control. Viking. Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press. Searle, J. R. (1990). Is the brain a digital computer? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 64(3), 21–37. doi: 10.2307/27652633 Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2018). Regulate AI to avert cyber arms race. Nature, 556, 296-298. doi: 10.1038/556296a Winfield, A. F., & Jirotka, M. (2018). Ethical governance is essential to building trust in robotics and AI systems. Philosophy & Technology, 31, 435–444. doi: 10.1007/s13347-018-0322-7.
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پژوهش‌های فلسفی -کلامی
دوره 28، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 107
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