نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
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چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Relationalism maintains that conscious perception is a relational state involving mind-independent objects as constituents. A key virtue of the view is its explanation of how perception fixes the reference of perceptual demonstratives: the demonstrated object partly constitutes the perceptual relation itself. Yet perceptual demonstratives exhibit both referential transparency and opacity—phenomena standardly accounted for by positing demonstrative senses or modes of presentation. Relationalism thus confronts a challenge: to explain how a perceptual relation to a single object can underwrite distinct modes of presentation. This paper systematically surveys the logical space of relationalist responses without advocating any particular position. It first articulates a sub-personal account in terms of mental files grounded in binding mechanisms, then argues that such accounts are inadequate due to the need for phenomenal manifestation of object identity. It proceeds to examine conscious-level alternatives: primitivism about objectual unity, apparent location accounts, and cognitivist (conceptualist) reductions of unity to implicit identity judgments.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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