The Importance of Being Conscious in the Debate over AI

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota, USA

چکیده

 This paper defends the evident reality of consciousness, including the existence of conscious, enduring selves, against recent objections raised by Helen Yetter-Chappell and Anil Seth. Yetter-Chappell advances a non-theistic idealism that echoes Hume's bundle theory, denying a substantial self behind experience, while Seth characterizes the self as a controlled hallucination generated by predictive brain processes. I argue that both accounts mischaracterize the common-sense phenomenology of self-awareness: when one reads, thinks, or feels pain, one is directly aware of oneself as a substantial, enduring subject – not of a "lurking" entity behind experience. I further contend that Seth's rejection of appearances is epistemically precarious and that his analogy between consciousness and heat fails to explain the subjective sensation of hotness. The paper then turns to the debate over artificial intelligence. If consciousness is bracketed and intelligence is analyzed behavioristically or functionally, AI may indeed equal or surpass human intelligence; however, this is profoundly different from being intelligent in the sense of conscious selfawareness. Through a critical engagement with Daniel Dennett's thought experiment of the unconscious robot "Zeke," I show that consciousness is both evident and indispensable to what we value in friendship, love, work, and moral life. The paper concludes that while behaviorism and functionalism may grant intelligence to AI, they cannot capture what it means to be a conscious, self-aware being – a reality of paramount importance for how we understand ourselves, other creatures, and God.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Importance of Being Conscious in the Debate over AI

نویسنده [English]

  • Charles Taliaferro
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, St. Olaf College, Northfield, Minnesota, USA
چکیده [English]

 This paper defends the evident reality of consciousness, including the existence of conscious, enduring selves, against recent objections raised by Helen Yetter-Chappell and Anil Seth. Yetter-Chappell advances a non-theistic idealism that echoes Hume's bundle theory, denying a substantial self behind experience, while Seth characterizes the self as a controlled hallucination generated by predictive brain processes. I argue that both accounts mischaracterize the common-sense phenomenology of self-awareness: when one reads, thinks, or feels pain, one is directly aware of oneself as a substantial, enduring subject – not of a "lurking" entity behind experience. I further contend that Seth's rejection of appearances is epistemically precarious and that his analogy between consciousness and heat fails to explain the subjective sensation of hotness. The paper then turns to the debate over artificial intelligence. If consciousness is bracketed and intelligence is analyzed behavioristically or functionally, AI may indeed equal or surpass human intelligence; however, this is profoundly different from being intelligent in the sense of conscious selfawareness. Through a critical engagement with Daniel Dennett's thought experiment of the unconscious robot "Zeke," I show that consciousness is both evident and indispensable to what we value in friendship, love, work, and moral life. The paper concludes that while behaviorism and functionalism may grant intelligence to AI, they cannot capture what it means to be a conscious, self-aware being – a reality of paramount importance for how we understand ourselves, other creatures, and God.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • consciousness
  • intelligence
  • Yetter-Chappell
  • Anil Seth
  • artificial intelligence
  • theism
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