پرسش از امکانِ متافیزیکِ خیر در سیر تحلیلِ ارسطو از مفهوم «آگاثون» (ἀγαθόν)

نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی پژوهشی

نویسنده

دکتری فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران

چکیده

ارسطو در پژوهش عملی به اقتضای غایتِش (خیر غایی) به مفهوم «آگاثون» یا «خیر کلی» می‌پردازد. گسترۀ دلالت و استعمال مقولیِ خیر همچون موجود (هستنده) است. از این‌رو وی به تأمل نظری در خیر، و مقایسه آن با موجود به نحو مطلق می‌پردازد. در سیرِ تحلیل ارسطو از مفهوم «آگاثون»، می‌توان هم‌هنگام پرسش از امکان برساختنِ متافیزیکی را در باب خیر با موضوع خیر بما هو خیر همسان با متافیزیک وجود و موضوع موجود بما هو موجود پی ‌گرفت. در این سیر، آشکار می‌شود که هرچند «موجود» و «خیر» گسترۀ دلالتِ واژگانی و اطلاقِ مقولیِ همسانی دارند اما ساختارِ ارجاعی و اشتراکِ معناییِ یکسانی ندارند. دلالت‌هایِ گوناگون موجود به یک معنای مشترکِ نخستین، و مقولات متعددِش به یک مقولۀ اصلی باز می‌گردد. این معنا و مقوله اصلی و اولیه، موجود نخستین و مقوله جوهر است و دانش متافیزیکِ وجود به عنوان دانایی نخستین به علت تقویم موضوع آن (موجود نخستین) شکل می‌گیرد. اما میان دلالت‌های گوناگون خیر هیچ معنای مشترکی وجود ندارد و خیر در هر مقوله به نحوی مستقل و بی‌ارتباط با سایر معانی و مقولات به کار می‌رود. فقدان معنای مشترک اولیه و مقوله اصلی که همه معانی و مقولات دیگر بدان بازگردند، مانع از تقویمِ موضوع مطلق خیر و حیث ذاتی بما هو خیر می‌شود. از این‌رو نمی‌توان همسان با موجود برای خیر، متافیزیکی تصور کرد با موضوع خیر بما هو خیر، که با نحوه نگرش نظریِ محضی همچون سوفیا در دانایی نخستین شناخته شود. در برابر امتناع تقویم اِیدوس (صورت) و فهم ایدتیک (صورت‌اندیش) از خیر که شرط تکوین دانش نظری است، ارسطو با نفی ایده خیر و نگرش دیالکتیک افلاطونی، حیث کلی و نظری خیر را رها کرده و به خیر انسانی معطوف به تحقق عملی آن (خیری که انسان در عمل می‌تواند به دست آورد) می‌پردازد و در ادامه طرح‌واره‌ای از آن معطوف به تحقق عملی ترسیم می‌کند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Question of the Metaphysics of Good in the Process of Aristotle’s Analysis of Agathón (ἀγαθόν)

نویسنده [English]

  • Seyed Jamaleddin Mirsharafoddin (Sharaf)
PhD. Graduate in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Practical research, according to Aristotle, strives to actualize the Supreme Good as the ultimate end of life. The Final Good could be determined if preceded by an outline based on conceptual analysis. For this reason, Aristotle considers agathón (ἀγαθόν), as the universal concept of good, and clarifies its conceptual-categorical structure to explain how we can understand it. In virtue of the similarity between good and existences for their extension of senses (good has as many meanings as existences), Aristotle proceeds to analyze good compared to existence as an absolute philosophical conception. Alongside his comparative study of good and existence, we can consider a metaphysics for good similar to the metaphysics of being and question its possibility. Corresponding to the metaphysics of existence that considers being qua being, one can imagine a metaphysics for good that investigates goodness qua goodness and explores its philosophical characteristics and theoretical attributes aimed at the question of its possibility.
It appears, in the process of Aristotle’s analysis that there is a common meaning and central definite characteristic in several significations and different categories of being by reference to one starting point: the primary being or substance. From the categorical point of view, similarly, various categories are accidental qualities of the fundamental category of substance. Because of the one principle of the primary being or substance, a metaphysics for being which contemplates on being qua being would be possible.
But good, on the contrary, is used homonymously in various different senses without any common meaning and with no reference to one principle. Of the categorical attitude, good is applied in any individual category independently with no connection with each other and by no reference to one main category. There is not, in fact, any category of primary good or substantial good which constitutes universal meaning and a single category as an appropriate subject matter for the intended knowledge of the metaphysics of good. Consequently, it is not possible to establish one primary philosophy for goodness qua goodness in the same way as the first philosophy of being as being.
Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is composed of the eidos (form or essence) as a universal absolute subject and eidetic attitude as a necessary theoretical way of understanding. Eidetic view and eidos entity are based on the common meaning and single principle which are not found in the concept of good. Thus, the theoretical approach to good, which could not constitute the eidos of good and eidetic knowledge, leads to the Platonic Idea of good and the dialectical attitude. But Aristotle who does not follow dialectic, cannot obtain the eidetic path to goodness either, and, therefore, reconstructs good as the well-being which is the final good that humankind can obtain practically. So he goes on to outline good not as the good in itself which in essence necessitates theoretical cognition, but as a final good of human life that is a condition that entails practical realization.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • agathon
  • universal good
  • goodness qua goodness
  • metaphysics of good
  • common meaning
  • good in itself
  • main sense

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