بررسی تطبیقی دیدگاه النور استامپ و جاشوا هافمن در باب کارآمدی دعای استغاثه

Some philosophers of religion have doubted the efficacy of prayer in the possible world created by the God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good. Eleanore Stump has questioned the possibility of explaining effective prayer due to the implications of God’s pure benevolence, like the necessity of guiding the world to the best possible state, and maintaining the world in that state. Joshua Hoffman, on the contrary, has defended the efficacy of prayer by explaining the possibility of its necessary condition and criticizing the opposing arguments against it. The comparative-analytical examination of the principles and premises of each of these two views reveals that the following presuppositions can play an important role in explaining the efficacy of prayer: the criterion for the efficacy of prayer, explaining the quality of the creation of the world(s) in light of divine attributes (either all or some of them), as well as the possibility of offering prayer in the best possible world. Al in all, it seems that neither Stump’s argument in challenging the efficacious prayer is strong enough, nor Hoffman’s defense strategy is effective enough.
Introduction
Eleanor Stump has formulated the problem of the inconsistency of effective prayer with some of God’s attributes in an argument with 12 premises. In the next step, however, from a moral point of view and relying on the role of prayer in balancing the divine-human relationship, she has offered a new theological account of the efficacy of prayer. Joshua Hoffman, in contrast, rejects both Stump’s argument as a serious threat to effective prayer and her account as a plausible solution. This article only deals with the first part of their claims.
Stump’s Argument
In her argument, Stump examines the positive or negative change that petitionary prayer may make in the current state of the world. She argues that a prayer that makes the world worse than it would otherwise be is ineffective because the absolute knowledge, power, and goodness of God logically prevent such a prayer from being answered. Also, if a prayer makes the world better than it would otherwise be, an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God will do so even if no prayer has been made for it. Therefore, petitionary prayer has no change on the state of the world.
Hoffman’s Defense
Hoffman seeks to prove a relatively modest claim. He tries to show that what he takes to be a necessary (not sufficient) condition for the efficacy of petitionary prayer can be met on the traditional conception of God. According to Hoffman, petitionary prayer is the practice of making a request of God in the hope that one’s request will be granted and the belief that at least some of these requests are effective. In other words, God actualizes the petitioned state, s, because of the prayer made for it, p, not just for the sake of that which is prayed for. This implies that if p is an effective prayer, then God’s bringing about s is contingent upon the realization of p. It also implies that one’s praying for s is contingent. Accordingly, the necessary condition for a prayer to be effective (NC) can be stated in the form of a conditional proposition: “If a prayer for a state of affairs, s, is efficacious, then there is a possible world in which that prayer is not made, and in which s is not obtained.”
Threats Against NC
Hoffman’s strategy to defend his position is to disarm the arguments that seem to threaten his NC. He names these arguments as A, B, and C and tries to show that none of these can pose serious threats against the satisfaction of NC. Arguments A and B presuppose that God necessarily creates “the unique best possible world,” and thus, God must bring about s even if no one has prayed for it. By a logical analysis, Hoffman shows that the crucial condition in argument A is only trivially true, and therefore, it can pose no threat to his NC. Also, by challenging the assumption of the unique best possible world, he rejects the presupposition of both arguments A and B.
Argument C assumes that God creates an optimal world, but not a unique optimal world. Accordingly, if one prays for some state of affairs, s, which God subsequently brings about, then since God necessarily creates an optimal world, He would have brought about s even if one hadn’t prayed for s. Using the concept of “moral compensation,” Hoffman tries to show that it is possible to compensate for the lack of a desired state of affairs in an optimal possible world by replacing it with another state that enjoys equal good.
Discussion
One may criticize Stump’s argument on the ground of what follows: The premises of her argument ironically imply the possibility of the world’s improvability. Her argument disregards the concept of the current value of the world in relation to the past and future, and there is an ambiguity in the concept of being a better or worse state of the world compared to its current state and after the prayer is answered. In explaining effective prayer, her account ignores concepts such as the welfare and interest of the petitioner, and the wisdom and providence of God, and it provides a very limited definition of the criterion for the efficacy of prayer.
Against Hoffmann’s defense, one may raise these criticisms: misunderstanding of Stump’s argument, ignoring the standard rules in logic for the truth of counterfactual conditionals, the inconsistency of the necessity of creating the best possible world(s) with free will and with the Christian theological tradition, ambiguity in his hypothetical arguments (A, B, C), and choosing a long difficult path to prove NC.
Conclusion
Authors maintain that their own account, “Answering-by-Disclosure Model (ADM),” which is an account based on the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, can provide a more accurate explanation of the efficacy of petitionary prayer and avoid the criticisms.